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This paper investigates how firms can orchestrate outbound open innovation strategically to 
accelerate technological progress among the firms they collaborate with, thus removing 
technological bottlenecks in their business ecosystem. We examine how a major oil and gas 
producer fostered, through its internal corporate venture unit, the development of new 
technologies aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the oilfield services offered by its key 
providers. The comparative analysis of five innovative projects suggests that two factors were 
critical for the successful deployment of the proposed technologies: their potential to broaden 
service providers’ portfolios and the possibility to retain control over the relevant intellectual 
property. The concurrent presence of these two factors incentivized service providers to deploy 
the new technologies, aligning their interests with those of the oil major company. By revealing 
unexplored aspects of the interplay of inter-firm collaborations and open innovation processes, 
this paper extends our understanding of how firms can align the incentives and activities of 
other actors in their business ecosystems by strategizing their open innovation initiatives.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Several industries have seen dramatic changes in their vertical structures in recent decades, 
shifting from integration to disintegration and, in some cases, reintegration of value-chain 
activities (Dietl et al., 2009; Jacobides, 2005; Kapoor, 2013). Changes in sectors’ vertical scope 
redefine the structure of interdependencies between industry participants, and thus affect 
capability development, value creation and appropriation patterns within sectors (Baldwin, 
2015; Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides and Winter, 2005). A key implication is that 
the firm controlling the core asset(s) upon which other firms build to offer their complementary 
products and services can become the leading player, or “hub firm”, of the emerging business 
ecosystem (Jacobides et al., 2018) and capture above-average rents in the sector (Baldwin, 
2015; Jacobides et al., 2006).  
 However, value must be created in the first place. Recent research suggests that cooperation 
with other firms whose activities are interdependent is essential to enable technology 
advancements in highly interconnected business ecosystems2 (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Iansiti 
and Levien, 2004; Pisano and Teece, 2007). Yet, specialized firms may have little incentive to 
invest in developing novel technological solutions that primarily benefit the hub firm. This 
undermines the hub firm’s capacity to create value (Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Cennamo, 2016) 
because specialized firms’ activities become a critical technological bottleneck. While the 
ecosystem literature highlights the critical role of bottlenecks as constraints to value creation, 
it offers limited insights into how the hub firm can remove them (Jacobides et al., 2018). Thus, 
we ask: how can the hub firm remove technological bottlenecks in the business ecosystem?  
 Some studies point to vertical integration as a possible solution to dispel bottlenecks and 
manage ecosystem interdependencies (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 
2016). However, vertical integration may not always be a viable or attractive option for firms. 
Therefore, identifying alternative strategies to address bottlenecks and to align the activities of 
other ecosystem actors is crucial. We propose that a hub firm may leverage outbound open 
innovation (OOI) – the practice of commercially exploiting assets and internal inventions 
outside firms’ boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006b) – to induce firms that provide complementary 
services/products to accelerate technological progress, and thereby to resolve technological 
bottlenecks. Prior research suggests that firms can use OOI to generate additional revenue 
 
2 A business ecosystem defines the structure of interdependence of a set of firms that need to interact for a focal 
value proposition to materialize, or for inter-firms’ specific complementarities to be achieved (see Adner, 2017; 
Jacobides et al., 2018). 
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streams (Alexy et al., 2009; Bidault, 2004; Chesbrough, 2007), to obtain access to 
complementary knowledge, to establish new industry standards and to expand the market for 
their products and services (Grindley and Teece, 1997; West, 2003). Where coordination costs 
are high, OOI can become a strategic mechanism to coalesce other firms around the hub firm’s 
innovation and foster collaboration in an ecosystem, fomenting complementary innovation that 
can lead to the co-creation of new products and markets (Chesbrough and Garman, 2009; Leten 
et al., 2013). We extend this and the ecosystem literature by uncovering the mechanisms 
underlying this strategic orchestration process; that is, how the hub firm can use strategically 
OOI to influence other actors in its business ecosystems.  
 Focusing on the upstream oil and gas industry, we compare and contrast the deployment 
fortunes of diverse OOI projects carried out by a major oil and gas producer through its internal 
corporate venture unit. These projects were initiated in areas that the producer typically 
outsourced, in the hope of enhancing the effectiveness of providers’ complementary services 
through the deployment of novel technologies. While each project led to the discovery of a 
superior and viable technical solution, only those projects that also had the potential to broaden 
the service providers’ portfolios were deployed. Retaining control over the intellectual property 
(IP) of the novel technology was also critical for the oil major to incentivize service providers 
to adopt it, enabling them to unlock value from it. More generally, our study documents how 
OOI can be used strategically to align innovation activities within the ecosystem and induce 
firms performing complementary activities to adopt novel solutions, thus removing 
technological bottlenecks and enhancing value creation.  
 These findings advance our understanding of OOI and its strategic role for a firm whose core 
activities are highly interdependent with those of providers of complementary services. We 
extend the literature by suggesting that a hub firm can reinforce its core business activity by 
aligning other firms’ incentives in the ecosystem and promoting technological progress in 
complementary activities through the strategic orchestration of OOI. As recently highlighted 
by Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt (2014), the important link between a firm’s strategy and its OI 
activities warrants further investigation, particularly as concerns the possible strategic uses of 
OOI. Our study contributes to this line of research by shedding light on key factors enabling 
the hub firm to use OOI strategically to resolve its external technological bottlenecks.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing relevant literature, we 
illustrate our data and methods, providing a detailed description of the empirical context in 
which our study is grounded. Next, we present our findings and discuss how they inform extant 
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research on OI and business ecosystems. We conclude by acknowledging the key limitations of 
our study and suggesting avenues for future research. 
 
2. Background  
 
The way in which the different activities in an industry’s value chain are coordinated and 
divided up among firms has important implications not just for value capture (e.g. Jacobides et 
al., 2006; Porter, 1980), but also for value creation, because it influences firms’ ability to 
develop and market their innovations (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2016; 
Jacobides and Tae, 2015). Patterns of division of labour shape industry knowledge bases and 
the related trajectories of capability development (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 
2006), influencing firm-level innovative dynamics (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). As co-
specialization emerges and consolidates, firms’ unilateral attempts to change their sectors’ 
vertical structures may meet strong resistance from other industry participants (Ferraro and 
Gurses, 2009; Jacobides, 2008; Scott et al., 2000) – even if this results in gradual technological 
obsolescence, unmet customer needs and a lack of capability development.  
 In managing the interdependencies arising from joint value creation, hub firms must deal 
with the challenges of coordinating the complementary activities of other firms in their 
ecosystems on whom they depend to unlock value from their core business activities (Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010). Apple, for instance, has to steer the development and marketing activities 
of an array of app developers to expedite the creation of complementary products that can 
enhance the value of its iPhone for final users (Kapoor, 2018). To align their incentives and 
coordinate their activities, Apple uses technology standards and platform interfaces, and sets 
market participation rules (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
 There is increasing evidence from the emerging literature on business ecosystems of how 
incentive misalignment or technical challenges experienced by “complementors” – firms 
specializing in products and services that are complementary to a hub firm’s core 
technology/business – can constrain the production and supply of the required complements 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Adner and Kapoor, 2016; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2016). This 
creates bottlenecks (Baldwin, 2015) in the complements concerned, undermining the value-
creation capacity of the hub firm. Thus, a strategic problem for the hub firm is how to dispel 
these bottlenecks and align the complementary activities of other actors. It is a complex issue 
since, unlike typical buyer-supplier relationships, specialized firms in business ecosystems are 
autonomous in terms of what they do, and how (Gulati et al., 2012; Jacobides et al., 2018). 
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 While prior research has documented the existence of bottlenecks in different ecosystems 
(Baldwin, 2015), it provides limited evidence of how a hub firm can address them. Some studies 
discuss vertical integration into the complementary activities underlying the bottleneck 
components as a possible solution but highlight that this may trigger value-capture tensions that 
can ultimately impair joint value creation (Zhu and Liu, 2018). In his study on the US 
videogame industry, Cennamo (2016) shows that providers of videogame consoles, in order to 
address the bottlenecks in complements (i.e. videogames) that were holding them back from 
the launch of next-generation consoles, initially produced videogames in-house. However, in 
doing so, they entered into competition with external game developers with whom they needed 
to partner in order to create value for gamers, with detrimental effects on performance. 
 Besides the drawback highlighted above, vertical integration into the activities underlying 
bottleneck components may not always be viable, since firms may lack the required resources 
and capabilities. Therefore, alternative strategies to address bottlenecks need to be identified. 
Recent studies have pointed to OI as a potential mechanism to elicit collaboration around a core 
innovation (Chesbrough et al., 2014). In this view, by opening part of its innovation activity to 
other players, the hub firm can build collaborative relationships with multiple actors and direct 
complementors’ activity (Alexy et al., 2013; Chesbrough et al., 2014; Leten et al., 2013).  
 
2.1 OOI and its strategic use  
 
OI models (Chesbrough, 2006a; Gassmann, 2006) can help explain how firms strategically 
manage their boundaries to accelerate new technology development and adoption (Jacobides 
and Billinger, 2006). Particularly relevant in the context of the present study is OOI, which has 
steadily increased over the last decade (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2007; 
Grönlund et al., 2010; Tranekjer and Knudsen, 2012; Chesbrough and Brunswicker, 2014).  
 Firms pursue external knowledge exploitation for both monetary and strategic reasons 
(Fosfuri, 2006; Rivette and Kline, 2000). By selling or licensing-out their technologies, they 
may fully capitalize on their internal knowledge, generating additional revenue streams (Alexy 
et al., 2009; Bidault, 2004; Chesbrough, 2007). In this regard, OOI has often been associated 
with the use of strong appropriation mechanisms (Dahlander and Gann, 2010; West, 2006). Yet, 
besides monetary considerations, there are a number of strategic objectives that may drive them 
to engage in outbound open innovation, as summarized in Table 1. They include establishing 
new industry standards, gaining access to complementary knowledge through cross-licensing 
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agreements and growing the market for their products and services (Grindley and Teece, 1997; 
Lichtenthaler, 2010; West, 2003).  
 More recently, scholars have suggested that firms can use IP-sharing and free revealing 
strategies to elicit collaboration from other actors in their business ecosystems and to shape the 
direction of their innovation activities (Alexy et al., 2013; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Leten 
et al., 2013). Others have also highlighted that firms can leverage open collaboration platforms 
to share knowledge and ideas with other members of their ecosystems, and accelerate the 
development and commercialization of complementary innovations (Chesbrough and Garman, 
2009). While these studies have enriched our understanding of the strategic objectives 
underlying firms’ use of OOI, shedding light on its potential to foster collaboration in 
ecosystems, they offer limited insights on how to achieve that. In particular, the mechanisms 
through which firms may entice other ecosystem actors to exploit the knowledge that they 
internally developed and intentionally shared remain poorly understood.  
 Prior research on desorptive capacity and outward technology transfers highlights that many 
firms fail to achieve the benefits sought from their OOI initiatives due to their limited ability to 
identify opportunities for external knowledge exploitation (Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 
2010). It also highlights that the reasons driving a focal firm to externally exploit its knowledge 
influence its decisions in terms of IP management and organizational structure (Ziegler et al., 
2013). To tackle the challenges arising from the external exploitation of their knowledge assets, 
many firms establish dedicated organizational units (Bianchi, et al., 2011; Chesbrough and 
Winter, 2014). These organizational vehicles expedite the external exploitation of internal ideas 
and technologies by leveraging specific resources and skills, and orchestrate commercial 
deployment for projects lacking internal applications (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Although recent studies have contributed to shed light on the organizational implications of 
OOI processes and on the challenges they pose (Chiaroni et al., 2011; Mortara and Minshall, 
2011), questions about their underpinning mechanisms remain. Extant research has primarily 
focused on the firm-level determinants of outbound initiatives, neglecting their critical 
interdependencies with the activity of other firms in the ecosystem and with their project-related 
decisions (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2014). The need to complement firm-level analyses of OI with 
research at other levels has been repeatedly highlighted (West et al., 2006; Chesbrough and 
Bogers, 2014), but with little progress as yet. Heeding the call for multi-level research on OI 
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(West et al., 2014), our exploratory study captures how firms embed OOI projects in their 
ecosystem strategies, uncovering the mechanisms they use to accelerate technological progress 
in their complementary activities, thus removing external technological bottlenecks.  
  
3. Data and methods  
 
We address our research question by studying how a hub firm leveraged outbound open 
innovation to prompt the deployment of new technologies by other actors in its ecosystem, 
which, in turn, enabled the hub firm to remove external technological bottlenecks. We followed 
a qualitative research approach (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We chose a method based on the 
comparative study of five OOI projects supported by the internal corporate venture unit of a 
focal oil and gas company to explore the mechanisms and factors that enabled the projects’ 
successful deployment, and ultimately influenced their uptake by external actors (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2014). We selected innovative projects dealing with upstream activities that had 
been outsourced to oilfield service providers and compared them across several dimensions to 
uncover the elements that led to their different outcomes in terms of deployment. Below we 
describe our research setting and empirical strategy, illustrating our data collection and analysis. 
 
3.1 Research setting 
 
The oil and gas industry has traditionally been characterized by high levels of vertical 
integration (Inkpen and Moffett, 2011). For over a century, oil majors such as BP, ExxonMobil, 
Shell and their predecessors have been managing activities ranging from oil and gas exploration 
to retailing gasoline and other refined products. However, starting from the early 1980s, their 
vertically integrated structures were partially dismantled, changing the scope of their activities 
(Yergin, 2008). In addition to divesting non-core assets, oil majors outsourced activities that 
yielded low margins – such as oilfield services, marine transportation and IT – to external 
contractors (Cibin and Grant, 1996). The emergence of specialized firms along the value chain 
progressively eroded the advantages of vertical integration, increasingly inducing oil majors to 
rely on intermediate markets for technology-intensive activities too (Bozon et al., 2005; Gooch, 
1997). This applied particularly to the upstream area of the industry (see Figure 1), where 
oilfield service providers (both large diversified firms and specialized niche ones) began to 
pioneer advanced technological solutions in activities such as seismic testing and reservoir 
characterization, well completion and drilling. 
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(Figure 1 about here) 
 
 Over time, oil majors’ increasing reliance on their oilfield service providers for new 
technology development has profoundly altered the balance of power (Bagheri and Di Minin, 
2015; The Economist, 2012). Today, the industry’s technology leaders are large diversified 
service companies such as Halliburton, Schlumberger and Baker Hughes, which provide 
complete solutions across a wide spectrum of technology fields. In contrast, most oil majors 
orchestrate work performed by service companies. Their expertise in several upstream areas 
has, thus, progressively faded away, leaving them critically dependent on the technologies 
developed by oilfield service providers (Acha and Cusmano, 2005; Pellegrini et al., 2012). 
 With the depletion of most easy-to-access oilfields, and the consequent need for oil majors 
to use advanced technologies to unlock new reserves in remote and hostile environments, the 
daunting consequences for value creation of this dependency became apparent. On one hand, 
the demand for specialized equipment and novel solutions from service companies has grown 
dramatically over the past decade, often exceeding supply (The Economist, 2012). On the other 
hand, oilfield service providers have generally focused on incremental technologies, leaving oil 
majors’ quest for more radical developments unattended. Given the high risks and cost of failure 
associated with the development of breakthrough technologies, they had little incentive to 
pursue them, which explains the slow pace of technological progress in the industry (Lloyd’s 
Register Energy, 2014; Perrons, 2014).  
 The company we investigated, Elektra (a pseudonym), is a key player in the upstream oil 
and gas industry and is widely regarded as an innovative leader. In the mid-90s, to promote 
long-term and step-changing innovations, Elektra created an internal corporate venture unit 
called BV (a pseudonym) which offers creative people an outlet to initiate innovative ideas.3 
To be eligible for funding, ideas must potentially provide a huge profitability gain or open new 
growth opportunities. Following an approach typical of venture capitalists, ideas are reviewed 
and nurtured until they reach a technical proof of concept, a stage known internally as 
“graduation”. Possible deployment options for “graduate projects” include internal deployment, 
licensing, partnering or commercialization through new ventures. 
 Our focus is on five BV projects in drilling, logging and completion – upstream activities 
that Elektra outsources to service companies. The sample selection proceeded as follows. First, 
 
3 BV acts as an orchestrator within Elektra, assembling teams of experts and industry players to assess the potential 
of new technologies and identify possible deployment routes. 
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in order to enhance comparability and minimize extraneous variation (Eisenhardt, 1989), we 
included only projects that had been reviewed and funded by BV, excluding those developed 
elsewhere in the company. We then restricted our focus to technological projects dealing with 
outsourced activities in which Elektra no longer had in-house expertise and, hence, required 
cooperation with third parties. Within this sample, we selected projects that differed in terms of 
deployment outcomes (achieved vs not achieved) and manner of deployment, with the aim of 
maximizing variation. Our emphasis on deployment was motivated by the fact that deployment 
challenges are a major barrier to technological progress in the upstream oil and gas industry 
(Lloyd’s Register Energy, 2014), where risk-related issues deter most firms from acting as first 
implementers of novel solutions. To account for risk elements, we ensured that the risk profile 
of the selected projects also varied.  
 Based on the criteria highlighted above, BV team members helped us to identify the projects 
most suitable for our investigation from among those for which richer information could be 
obtained either by interviewing the people involved or through archival data, or both. Our final 
sample consisted of five projects that we will call “Alpha”, “Beta”, “Gamma”, “Delta” and 
“Omega” (see Table 2 for a summary of their characteristics). 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
 
Given the nature of our study, spanning both micro-level (project) and meso-level (industry) 
dimensions, our data collection strategy encompassed multiple and differentiated sources of 
information. Both primary and secondary data at the industry, organizational and project levels 
were gathered and integrated (see Appendix A for a full overview of our data sources). 
  We reviewed industry reports, books, newspaper articles and journal publications, and 
interviewed multiple representatives from relevant players (e.g. oil majors, service companies, 
professional bodies) to gain a thorough understanding of the oil and gas industry, and of the 
roles played by different actors. Overall, we conducted 12 open-ended interviews in two 
separate rounds (2008, 2010). We also participated in six professional workshops, where we 
gathered information on technology development strategies, challenges and trends in the 
industry before triangulating it with interview and archival data.  
In parallel, we collected data from Elektra. We carried out 38 interviews in three separate 
rounds between 2008 and 2010, gaining a comprehensive overview of the new technology 
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projects that the firm had invested in over the previous 15 years and the strategic rationale 
behind them. We conducted a first round of open-ended interviews with BV managers, the 
director of Elektra’s internal venture capital fund and other senior executives involved in critical 
decisions on the development of new technology ventures. They helped us capture relevant 
aspects of the BV review and funding process and identify target respondents for the two 
subsequent rounds of interviews, which were more focused on project-level dynamics. 
Whenever possible, we approached proponents and sponsors of the five BV projects selected 
for investigation, as well as members of the panel committees that reviewed them. We followed 
a semi-structured interview protocol4, with questions typically addressing the genesis of the 
project and its main characteristics, the resources and capabilities required to move it forward, 
the key factors that influenced its progress, and its outcomes and potential deployment routes. 
Full access to project files stored in a central database owned by BV was provided, and internal 
documentation (including technology portfolio reviews, project plans, budgets and minutes of 
meetings) was reviewed to obtain information about each project. We also participated in some 
panel meetings, which allowed us to capture how the BV review and funding process worked. 
We aimed to ensure data triangulation and control for retrospective biases by relying on 
multiple data sources and informants (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Data analysis followed the logic of comparative case study research, combining within-case 
analysis with cross-case comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). We began by assembling 
all interview transcripts and archival documents for each of our five cases. After that, we started 
coding data on a within-case basis, using a thematic approach5 (Flick, 2006; Yin, 2010). First, 
we engaged in a thorough and “active” reading of the data, noting down ideas for possible 
patterns (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Then, guided by our analytic interest, we searched for 
statements that contained references to the nature of the novel technologies and to how they 
could create value, to the key implementation hurdles and to the actors involved in the process. 
Each of the identified statements was assigned a descriptive label that reflected the concept 
represented in that specific segment of text. This yielded us a list of first-order codes that were 
then consolidated across the five cases. Next, by continuously iterating between data and 
literature, we grouped first-order codes that shared common characteristics into more general 
 
4 Interviews typically lasted between 30 minutes and one hour, were tape-recorded, transcribed and, subsequently, 
submitted to interviewees for verification. Any follow-up questions needed were posed by phone or email. 
5 Thematic coding derives from Strauss’s original work (1987) and is appropriate specifically when comparing 
groups or entities that differ along specific lines of interpretation of a certain phenomenon (Strauss, 1987) or certain 
structural or processual characteristics (Flick, 2006). The procedure was adapted by Flick (2006) to enable 
comparative analysis across groups or categories; we applied it here to compare projects along a few critical 
dimensions. 
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second-order themes. Some of these themes were consistent with existing open innovation 
literature (e.g. control over IP) while others emerged from our case evidence (e.g. potential 
impact on complementors’ portfolios). In total, we identified six themes that were present in all 
five cases. Finally, by further abstraction, we grouped second-order themes into three main 
aggregate themes, which seemed to reflect the key elements of the overall story our data told 
about the deployment of novel technologies. Throughout the coding process the first and second 
authors, although working independently, interacted systematically to validate and refine codes 
and themes. The final data structure is presented in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. 
 The thematic structure developed through the coding process served as a basis for our cross-
case comparison (Flick, 2006), which aimed at identifying factors that could account for the 
different deployment outcomes of the five investigated projects. These factors, reported in 
Table 3, emerged from the systematic search for analogies and differences across the five cases, 
which was conducted separately by the first and second authors. The comparison was not aimed 
at revealing processual issues (as we did not code process data), but at identifying connections 
and patterns across core variables (e.g. IP rights and broadening effect) that might explain 
different deployment outcomes. Once key patterns were established, we asked relevant 
informants in the BV unit to validate their plausibility (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
4. Case evidence: oiling the wheels of complementary technology development 
 
Many of the voices we heard in upstream oil and gas lament that the current competence 
distribution has gradually slowed the development of step-changing innovations. At a time 
when technology is crucial to access new oil and gas reserves and maximize recovery from 
existing ones, most large oilfield service providers prefer to engage in incremental 
improvements, claiming that “oil majors should be only happy with what they (service 
providers) have been supplying for the last few years”, as one of our interviewees recalled.  
Given the reluctance of service companies to invest in highly innovative technologies, recent 
years have seen oil majors start to develop them independently. “There are cases in which 
companies like Elektra need to step up to the challenge and develop new technologies in-house, 
since otherwise nobody else in the industry would do it. It is like disturbing a commodity market, 
where service companies have no interest in upgrading their technologies” (AM, innovation 
manager at Elektra). 
As several of Elektra’s technology officers pointed out, the objective of oil majors’ renewed 
efforts towards technology development is not to enter areas of expertise traditionally managed 
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by the service industry, but to increase innovation at the level of majors’ complementary assets, 
setting new standards and spreading new capabilities that can enhance their productivity and 
yield additional returns. Once developed and tested, most of these complementary technologies 
are either directly licensed to service companies or marketed through new ventures.  
To extend the search for innovative ideas beyond the scope of internal R&D activities, 
Elektra, like its peers, has embraced OI, and set up BV to nurture promising but unproven 
concepts and speed up the development and deployment of new technologies also in non-core 
business areas. The five new technology development projects we analysed in this study were 
all executed between 1996 and 2007, but only two, Alpha and Beta, were successfully deployed, 
while Gamma, Delta and Omega were discontinued before reaching the field. Their in-depth 
investigation allowed us to uncover critical factors that influenced their deployment outcomes. 
The following case narratives, which are based on the accounts of the actors involved in the 
projects and on related archival data, illustrate salient aspects that ultimately shaped their fates. 
 
4.1 Project Alpha  
 
Alpha was initiated in 2003 with the objective of developing an entirely new perforation 
technique for the Exploration & Production (EP) business, enabling access to difficult 
hydrocarbons (tight reservoirs with low permeability) and substantial productivity 
improvements in impaired wells. 
Perforating is one of the final steps in completing a new well, opening a path for fluids to 
enter the well from the hydrocarbon reservoir. It typically entails lowering high-energy 
explosive devices into the well and firing them to create holes through its steel casing and 
cement liner. “It’s a very mature industry. There is stuff that has been around since the First 
World War. We had some brainstorming sessions to figure out how we could make it better, 
where better wasn’t just meaning incremental improvement but game-changing better” (AMK, 
lead proponent of Project Alpha). 
The proposed novel perforating technique was based on the highly innovative combination 
of jet ballistics technology, largely applied in the arms industry, with Elektra’s geotechnical 
and well-engineering expertise. This project, funded by BV, was carried out in cooperation with 
a leading international defence company and a provider of perforating solutions, who had 
Elektra’s internal venture capital fund (EVC) as one of its strategic investors. “We linked up 
with an external company that was developing tanks and munitions systems, and we directed 
their attention to the EP business by tapping their knowledge base. We brainstormed together 
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and came up with a couple of ideas that were novel not only to us and to the oil industry, but 
also to the arms business” (AMK).  
As a result of its broad range of applications (see Table 2), the new technology had the 
potential to open up a big market for “ultra-deep hole perforators” that had not been occupied 
either by competitors or service companies, and consequently was not available to Elektra’s 
operations. Elektra does not carry out perforation, which is outsourced to service companies, 
so its main expected benefit from investing in this project was to get access to difficult 
hydrocarbons with lower costs and increased productivity rates. “Elektra’s interest is to get the 
technology to the field as soon as possible and be a well-recognized co-developer and favoured 
customer” (GB, sponsor of Project Alpha).  
Members of Elektra knew that this area of expertise was fading away, and that they were left 
in the hands of their main service providers, which had no incentive to switch to new perforating 
technologies potentially cannibalizing their existing ones. Nevertheless, Alpha was questioned 
during BV review meetings. “The biggest criticism was: why should we do this in-house? Why 
don’t we just leave it to the service industry? It’s their area of expertise” (MB panel expert). 
However, BV’s managers were strongly committed to moving this technology forward. They 
supported and funded project Alpha until a successful technical proof-of-concept was achieved. 
Reaching that stage was a prerequisite for the pursuit of any subsequent deployment plans. “At 
that point, you have to decide whether you are going to drive the invention all the way to the 
end, or take it to the service industry and ask them to run it” (AMK). 
In principle, completion technology is left to large service companies such as Schlumberger, 
Halliburton and Baker Hughes, which manufacture perforating gun systems and charges for the 
whole industry. Although their involvement in Alpha’s deployment seemed natural from a 
commercial standpoint, BV’s early attempts to attract their interest repeatedly failed. The 
innovative perforation technology, which could allow oil producers to achieve substantial 
productivity gains, was seen as competing with service providers’ existing products. “Elements 
of the service industry started feeling pretty nervous about this invention, since we put pressure 
on them to upgrade their technologies and come up with new products” (AMK). 
The project’s lead proponent and the BV sponsor had been very active in raising interest 
about the new technology, involving experts and potential deployment partners in the early 
stages of its development process. Members of other Elektra teams had provided feedback on 
how to get to a field test quickly and suggested companies that could be suitable “homes” for 
the technology. However, arranging field trials posed huge problems: Elektra’s operating units 
were focused on optimizing day-to-day operations, so spending time and money on unproven 
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technologies was seen as a waste of resources. Moreover, since major service companies tightly 
cover perforating services, contractual issues made it tough to organize field trials of 
technologies that were not their own.  
Finding a first implementer was a real challenge. Eventually, a few operating units made 
themselves available to run and test the technology. In 2007, Elektra decided to invest, through 
EVC, its internal venture capital fund, in a small firm manufacturing the new perforating 
solutions, together with the defence company that had the IP rights on the technology. Through 
this joint-venture Elektra could secure an exclusive licence for a few years, and the 
manufacturing firm currently sells perforating tools to over 50 service providers. “That’s the 
weird part of it. We developed something for which we are the customers in the end. We invented 
something that service companies sell back to us for big money through our operations, but 
what Elektra gets out of it is a well that produces more than before” (AMK).  
 
4.2 Project Beta  
 
Beta started in 1996 with the aim of developing a new method that could combine logging and 
casing operations, thus saving rig time and reducing operational risks. The problem of getting 
logging tools stuck in highly deviated or horizontal wells had become increasingly common, 
and drillers needed an alternative to traditional wire-line and logging-while-drilling techniques.  
The proposed novel well-logging technology, quickly patented by its inventor, incorporated 
a drill bit with a centre that could be disengaged and re-engaged while the bit was downhole. 
This allowed drilling operations to be suspended and logging tools to be run in the hole through 
the drill pipe, recording data in memory modes. Given the expected cost savings – estimated at 
around 50% – this new method could potentially transform the way Elektra acquired log data 
and eventually become the new industry standard. It was opening up a new technology play, 
generically termed “wireless logging”, that allowed a number of high-impact applications (see 
Table 2) in a global market then worth about $500 million. 
 The project progressed relatively quickly through the BV review and funding process and, 
thanks to the project proponent’s network and to the early involvement of potential deployment 
partners, field trials and a prototype were in place as early as 1999. That required the 
development team to cooperate closely with a small UK well-service company manufacturing 
the required logging tools. “Elektra doesn’t drill, doesn’t make the equipment, and doesn’t do 
the measurement. We have no in-house expertise in that. So, when we came up with the idea for 
this new technology, we needed help and support from those companies to move it forward” 
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(CM, sponsor of project Beta). However, despite Beta’s advantages, the main oilfield service 
providers seemed uninterested in supporting its development. They had made huge investments 
in traditional logging technologies, for which they could charge oil majors higher costs, and 
wanted to stick with them. Switching to technologies more efficient than their established ones 
would have meant lower revenues for them. “In the end, the companies that are willing to help 
are those who see Elektra as a potential partner and not as a competitor, which means just the 
small ones. They need to grow their business, so they’re happy to work with us” (CM). 
The initial field trial, run by one of Elektra’s operating unit, was successful, and the project 
was soon taken over by EVC, which wanted to fast-track the commercialization of the new 
technology. Commercialization to third parties was the planned deployment route, although 
none of the major services companies had been willing to act as first implementer. “Since there 
is always some intrinsic failure risk, everybody was suggesting that we try with someone else 
first, and come back when the technology was clearly working. We had come up with a good 
idea but we had to face market rules!” (JR, lead proponent of Project Beta). 
 In 2005, EVC founded a new company, FB, to take the novel logging technology to market. 
With 14 registered patents, FB soon started commercializing different technological solutions, 
setting a new standard for the industry. The company worked closely with a manufacturer of 
logging tools to deploy several related applications. Gradually, Schlumberger and other service 
companies started adopting the new technology, and it grew quickly. In 2011, FB was acquired 
by Schlumberger, which added wireless logging solutions to its technology portfolio. 
“It is difficult to say whether the whole potential of the technology has been exploited. We 
had to be practical at a certain point and focus on our main objective, which was getting an 
alternative and cheaper logging technique. Since our service companies didn’t want to innovate 
on that, Elektra had to take the initiative” (CM). This implied also taking the technology to the 
market, bypassing the initial resistance of major service providers to deploy it.  
 
4.3 Project Gamma  
 
Project Gamma was initiated in 2002 with the objective of developing an alternative completion 
technique to improve sand control and minimize lost hydrocarbon production. Completions are 
the conduit between hydrocarbon reservoirs and surface facilities and are a critical part of any 
hydrocarbon field development project. They have to be designed to safely maximize 
hydrocarbon recovery from the well and may have to last for several years under ever-changing 
conditions. “When you have a well and put it into production, besides oil and gas, you also get 
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water – and, if the formation is weak, quite a lot of sand. Sand can be very damaging since it 
can easily erode pipelines. So, it is a major issue for us. This problem of sand control and its 
impact on oil production is a day-to-day problem that service companies try to solve by using 
filters that are quite expensive and hamper productivity, so it is not a good solution overall” 
(TA, lead proponent of Project Gamma).  
The proposed novel completion technique aimed to use mechanical cohesion to defer or 
prevent sand production in reservoirs. It relied on the “stress shielding” ability of slots cut into 
the wellbore. Since it was basically an alternative application of an existing water-jet 
technology, the new downhole solution only required optimization work, and could be 
implemented easily and quickly. Elektra had the opportunity to be the leading implementer, 
although the targeted final customers were major service companies, which actually run well-
completion operations for most oil majors – a market worth about $200 million p.a., according 
to the proponent’s estimates. Service companies, however, couldn’t really see a market for this 
completion technique, which, although more efficient, offered a limited range of applications. 
With only some computer modelling and experimentation needed, development progressed 
rapidly, and the project soon entered its execution phase. However, “we didn’t get our operating 
units or potential deployment partners involved at this stage. We decided to approach them at 
the end of the process, when a clear deployment strategy had been defined” (TA). Despite 
successful laboratory tests, arranging field trials posed huge problems. Elektra had decided not 
to pursue commercialization to third parties immediately, but to try publishing a few articles 
first to raise awareness of the new technique – thus gaining legitimization as first implementer. 
“There was some discussion on the deployment, and it was thought that since Company X had 
the patent on the water-jet that we were using to cut slots in the wellbore, it was better to keep 
the new technique as Elektra’s knowledge” (GB, sponsor of Project Gamma). Since the novel 
completion solution used an extant technology, it was difficult to protect it with a patent. 
Publishing articles on it was a clear strategy to initially circumvent this risk. Moreover, since a 
big service company owned the technology, it was difficult to appropriate value. “Eventually 
we decided to keep it for ourselves and try to pursue internal deployment first” (GB). However, 
getting availability from Elektra’s operating units to run field trials was challenging, as none of 
them wanted to act as first implementer. Though technically successful, Project Gamma ended 





4.4 Project Delta 
 
Project Delta started in 2001 with the aim of developing a novel downhole welding technique, 
enabling tight connections in high pressure and high temperature (HPHT) wells. The 
availability of tools and equipment that could operate in such extreme environments has become 
vital to oil and gas companies, which must drill ever deeper in increasingly hostile conditions 
due to declining reserves. Welding two elements downhole requires reducing wellbore fluid 
pressure to a specific level, which is a challenge. The proposed method entailed the formation 
of a sealing weld, joining an upper and a lower wellbore casing element by means of a 
mechanical locking mandrel.  
By potentially enabling downhole welding for spider wells and low casing flow wells in 
HPHT environments, this novel solution could lead to a 15% reduction in well costs and 
enhance oil recovery by 5%, as well as significantly lowering operational risks. Although no 
fundamental new technology was required, developing the downhole robotics for this project 
was expected to be challenging. Given the lack of in-house expertise, external contractors had 
to be involved in the design and development of welding and ancillary equipment. 
Funded by BV, Project Delta was run in cooperation with three companies specialized in 
downhole welding systems, welding power supplies and cable design. As they worked on 
proving technical feasibility, the project team actively explored possible deployment 
opportunities with major service companies (such as Halliburton). However, finding a 
commercialization partner that wanted to play a leading role in developing and bringing this 
technology to the market under a licensing agreement with Elektra, which owned the IP, proved 
to be a major challenge. The main oilfield service providers preferred to stick to alternative 
existing technologies, since they generally deemed that the novel welding solution would not 
have enabled them to broaden the range of services they could offer, and, hence, increase their 
revenues. Despite being technically sound, Project Delta failed to find a first implementer and, 
therefore, was closed with no uptake by the business. 
 
4.5 Project Omega 
 
Project Omega was initiated in 2000 with the aim of developing a novel method to measure 
drilling fluid parameters with a downhole chemical sensor. Drilling fluids are used to aid the 
drilling process and maximize recovery by transporting cuttings to the surface, controlling 
pressure, cooling and lubricating drilling bits and preventing formation damage. Their 
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performance is critical for borehole stability, and the timely detection of deficiencies in their 
chemical composition may help prevent significant well- and safety-related problems. 
In recent years, the development of microfluidics techniques has allowed chemical assays 
traditionally conducted in labs to be performed on small chips on site, allowing much faster 
responses to detected problems. The technique proposed by Project Omega would measure fluid 
composition using an integrated microchip sensor, enabling downhole real-time analyses. This 
highly innovative solution was expected to represent a step-change in preventing borehole 
instability and taking remedial action, thus becoming the new industry standard. It could 
potentially allow Elektra to achieve a $10million/year reduction in well costs from decreased 
rig downtime and generate significant revenues for deployers through many applications.  
Funded by BV, Project Omega was run in partnership with an external contractor 
specialized in lab-on-a-chip solutions that owned the IP rights to the novel sensor. Securing a 
strong IP position was key for Elektra, which aimed to patent the method for applying this tool 
to hydrocarbons. While trying to reach a proper IP contract with the microfluidic technology 
provider, the project team and its BV sponsor engaged with several major oilfield service 
providers to explore their interest in deploying the novel tool under a licensing agreement. 
However, despite its many potential applications and a successful proof-of-concept, Project 
Omega failed to obtain service companies’ buy-in. Although a couple of them had initially 
showed some interest in acting as first implementers, bearing the cost of trying the technology 
in the field, negotiations did not progress, and commercialization plans eventually fell through. 
 
4.6 Cross-case comparison 
 
Our case evidence reveals that, within the same context, we can observe quite heterogeneous 
deployment outcomes. While the technologies from Alpha and Beta were successfully brought 
to market and gradually adopted, Gamma, Delta and Omega failed to be implemented. Why? 
In this section, we explore alternative explanations for such heterogeneity and identify factors 
that, within our sample, appear to drive it. As Table 3 summarizes, we compared our focal 
projects according to six dimensions that coincide with the second-order themes identified 
through our coding: degree of novelty, expected implementation benefits (for Elektra), control 
over IP, potential impact on complementors’ portfolios, engagement with deployment partners 
and availability of a first implementer. These dimensions were grouped into three broader 
categories: technology attributes, deployment incentives and enabling factors for deployment.  
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(Table 3 about here) 
 
Technology attributes. Technological and economic characteristics of a technology influence 
firms’ decisions to invest in novel solutions and shape their development and deployment paths. 
Through our coding process, we identified two technology attributes that were relevant across 
all cases: degree of novelty and expected implementation benefits. First, we considered whether 
the degree of novelty of the solutions proposed could explain differences in their deployment. 
Interestingly, radical projects (Alpha and Beta) seemed to be more successful in terms of 
deployment than incremental ones (Gamma and Delta). This seemed to suggest that, despite 
being riskier, radical projects might appear more attractive in terms of deployment, as being 
potentially more impactful. However, the evidence of Omega does not support this claim: 
although it promised a radical change in fluid measurement techniques, its deployment failed. 
Next, we compared the key benefits expected by Elektra from the implementation of the novel 
technologies. Irrespective of whether they were deployed or not, all projects seemed to have 
the potential to deliver productivity improvement and cost reduction benefits. This attribute, 
therefore, seems more a prerequisite for investing in the novel technologies, rather than a factor 
discriminating between those that were or were not deployed. 
 Deployment incentives. Many novel technologies fail to reach the market due to the lack of 
incentives from potential deployers. Identifying factors that may incentivize their adoption 
becomes, then, crucial to foster their implementation. Through our coding, we identified two 
factors that seem to play an incentivizing role for deployment: control over IP and the potential 
impact on complementors’ (the targeted deployers) portfolios. We explored whether variations 
in the IP profiles of the novel technologies and in the associated possibilities to extract value 
from commercialization could explain our results. However, our evidence does not present a 
consistent pattern. Both Gamma and Delta were unsuccessful from a deployment standpoint, 
but while for Gamma no IP rights on the technology could be enforced, Delta could rely on 
strong IP protection. We then considered whether the potential broadening or deepening impact 
that the novel solutions could have on the portfolios of technologies owned by the 
complementors (the target deployers), and their respective financial implications, could be a 
discriminating factor between successful and unsuccessful projects. Projects having a potential 
broadening impact (Alpha and Beta), and, hence, a potential to yield service providers 
additional revenue streams, seemed generally more successful in terms of deployment than 
those having a deepening impact (Gamma and Delta), which could instead yield lower extra 
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returns for them. However, Project Omega provides conflicting evidence: although it could 
potentially broaden the range of services that adopters could offer, its deployment failed. 
 At this point we noted a pattern emerging from our data. Neither strong IP control nor a 
potential broadening impact per se appeared to be sufficient to incentivize service companies 
to deploy the novel technologies, as suggested by project Delta and Omega respectively. Our 
intuition was that successful deployment was determined by the combination of a strong IP 
control and a potential broadening (not deepening) impact on the portfolio of services that 
deployers would be able to offer as a result of the technology adoption.  
 Evidence from Alpha and Beta, in which this combined effect can be observed, supports this 
logic. Both projects aimed at introducing highly innovative technologies, potentially enabling 
a broad range of applications in oilfield operations. Given its quite diverse applicability, Alpha 
“could solve a number of difficult hydrocarbons issues” (GB, sponsor of Project Alpha), with 
significant productivity gains for oil producers. IP rights could be enforced through an exclusive 
licence agreement, which was highly desirable since it could secure an initial competitive edge. 
Despite competing with service companies’ existing products somewhat, and “disturbing a 
commodity market” (GB), this novel technology could enable service providers to broaden the 
range of solutions offered to their customers, and potentially open up a new market for ultra-
deep perforators. Similarly, the novel well-logging technology proposed by Project Beta offered 
a number of high-impact applications that could significantly broaden service providers’ 
portfolios, opening up an entirely new technology play with huge commercial prospects. 
Although “service companies wanted to keep using their established technologies, for which 
they could charge more to oil producers” (CM, sponsor of Project Beta), the potential of adding 
new revenue streams to their business was a lure difficult to resist. With 14 patents covering 
the broad Beta technological umbrella, the new logging solutions were rapidly brought to 
market by a new company set up by EVC, Elektra’s internal venture capital fund. Interestingly, 
the technologies from both Alpha and Beta were deployed by investing in new ventures that 
pursued their initial commercialization, as indicated in Table 2. This deployment approach, 
which Elektra contemplates only when full control on IP is attainable and new technologies are 
real breakthrough with a potential to broaden considerably the range of solutions available in 
the market, set the ground for the subsequent adoption by the main service providers.  
 Enabling factors for deployment. Finding a “home” for a novel technology is often a 
challenge, especially when external deployment is pursued. Firms resort to different strategies 
to lower the risk of having orphan projects and to help them get implemented. Through our 
coding, we identified two factors that seem to play an enabling role for deployment: the 
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engagement with potential deployment partners and the availability of a first implementer. We 
first considered whether the stage at which potential deployment partners were involved could 
explain differences in the deployment outcomes of the projects. For both Alpha and Beta, the 
engagement with operating units and other potential deployers was sought at an early phase of 
the development process by the respective project teams. “Whenever I met people in the 
operating units who were knowledgeable in this area of expertise, I was getting them involved. 
I was showing this technology and saying that it would be ready in a couple of years” (AMK, 
proponent of Project Alpha). “It’s very difficult to pursue this type of project completely 
internally, since you need the hardware from the outside; you don’t have the equipment. But 
you also need support from operating units, since they are the ones actually allowing you to do 
the trials” (JR, proponent of Project Beta). Although it eased the deployment of Alpha and Beta, 
especially in the arrangement of their field trials, the early involvement of potential deployment 
partners did not appear sufficient to enable the adoption of Delta and Omega, whose 
deployment failed. The availability of a first implementer, an entity ready to run and test a novel 
technology as soon as it is fully developed appears instead more critical to successful 
deployment. Typically, firms are reluctant to act as first implementers and prefer to wait until 
novel solutions have been fully tested elsewhere and it is clearly demonstrated that upsides 
exist. However, the possibility of having preferential access to new technologies allowing them 
to solve relevant operational problems and/or significantly improve their performance, may 
offset their reservations. Importantly, by trying them out in the field, first implementers reduce 
the risks associated with the implementation of novel solutions, enhancing their chances of 
being subsequently deployed, as the evidence of Alpha and Beta suggests.  
  In sum, our findings suggest that Elektra succeeded in introducing innovative technologies 
in its ecosystem when they had the potential to broaden the range of services that service 
companies could offer – but only when this was coupled with control over the IP. When these 
two factors were both present, service companies, despite initial reluctance, were incentivized 
to adopt and deploy the novel technologies, since they could gain a potential competitive edge 
over their rivals and increase their returns. Ultimately, this also affected the likelihood of 







5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper we studied how an ecosystem’s hub firm can strategically leverage OOI to align 
the complementary innovation activities of other ecosystem actors, thus removing external 
technological bottlenecks that constrain its value creation capacity in the core business. 
 We focused on the upstream oil and gas industry to elucidate how the hub firm (an oil major 
in our context) strived to induce its providers of complementary services to adopt new 
technologies. Following the externalization of R&D in several upstream activities, oil majors’ 
competitiveness in oilfield exploration and production has become highly dependent on the 
pace of innovation of service providers. By favouring investments in incremental technologies, 
these companies have represented a main source of bottlenecks in the ecosystem, keeping oil 
majors from advanced technical solutions that could potentially yield productivity gains.  
 The slowdown in the development of radical innovations in the upstream oil and gas industry 
reflects some more general dynamics of firm innovation in ecosystems: vertical specialization 
along the value chain and the interdependencies arising from it, which create room for critical 
bottlenecks that may hamper technology advancements (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Cacciatori 
and Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides and Winter, 2005). While prior work on business ecosystems 
has highlighted the critical role of interdependence among actors and how it may lead to the 
emergence of bottlenecks (Adner and Kapoor, 2010), it has provided limited insights on how 
firms can align the activities of other ecosystem actors to solve this issue.  
 We provide evidence supporting the idea that, by investing strategically in new technologies 
that can offer value creation possibilities also to its complementors (service providers in our 
context), the hub firm can align their incentives and entice them to adopt the new technologies. 
Figure 2 offers an illustration of how, in our context, the hub firm orchestrated its relationships 
with different actors within the ecosystem to remove technological bottlenecks through the 
external deployment of novel technologies.  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
Drawing on our cross-cases evidence, Figure 2 synthesizes an emerging process in which the 
hub firm’s orchestrating unit contributes to aligning incentives across the ecosystem to foster 
the deployment of novel technological solutions. First, it actively engages with external 
specialized actors who possess the skills needed to develop the focal technologies (step 1 in 
Figure 2). Coordinating the development of novel technologies is the first step of the 
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orchestration process represented in Figure 2. The alignment of the incentives of the firms 
ultimately deploying these technologies in the field, the oilfield service providers in our 
research context, is a critical part of the orchestration process (step 2 in Figure 2). It determines 
the subsequent deployment and adoption of these technologies by providers of complementary 
services (step 3 in Figure 2). In its orchestrating role, our focal organizational unit is tasked 
with selecting technologies that would allow the alignment of the service companies’ interests 
with the hub firm’s objectives. Critical here is securing control over the technology’s IP and 
identifying technologies that have the potential to broaden service companies’ offerings, thus 
enhancing their revenue prospects. Bottlenecks are removed when the providers of 
complementary services, upon the adoption of the novel technologies developed by the hub 
firm, can provide the latter with services based on these novel and more effective technology 
solutions (step 4 in Figure 2).6 Thus, the success of this outbound open innovation process 
orchestrated by the hub firm is grounded critically in the alignment of the incentives for the 
deployment of these technologies. 
 Figure 2 elucidates how a hub firm can use outbound OI strategically to orchestrate 
ecosystem members’ activity and influence the pace of new technology development and 
adoption within the ecosystem. By shedding light on the mechanisms enabling this process, our 
study enhances our understanding of the interplay between the structure of technological 
interdependence in the ecosystem and firms’ open innovation activities, contributing to research 
on ecosystems and OI in several ways. We discuss this in the next section. 
 
5.1 Contribution and theoretical implications  
  
Ecosystem research has highlighted the importance of a hub firm’s orchestration activities for 
managing interdependencies and unlocking value creation (e.g. Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; 
Nambisan and Sawhney; 2011; Teece, 2007). Yet, the mechanisms that a hub firm can use to 
align ecosystem members’ activities remain poorly understood. Some studies have pointed to 
vertical integration as a strategy to manage ecosystem interdependencies and address potential 
bottlenecks to value creation (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Cennamo, 2016). However, given the 
 
6 The strategic use of OOI elucidated here shifts the focus from a firm’s own new product development (typical 
for inbound OI) towards developing technologies that can affect the strategic drivers in the industry so as to benefit 
the hub firm’s core business. This shift is echoed in Vanhaverbeke and Chesbrough (2014), using an example that, 
incidentally, focuses on the relationship between oil companies and service providers. 
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complexity and costs associated with this governance structure, vertical integration may not 
always be a viable or attractive option for firms (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
 While acknowledging bottlenecks as important constraints to value creation in innovation 
ecosystems and discussing issues of coordination and alignment as critical to prevent their 
emergence, prior work offers limited insights into how bottlenecks can be resolved. Our study 
contributes to filling this gap by suggesting that a hub firm can use OOI strategically to manage 
ecosystem interdependencies and address technological bottlenecks in its complementary 
activities. Whereas prior research has focused on the design choice of the structural elements 
of the ecosystem – i.e. the “alignment structure” (Adner, 2017) – influencing members’ 
incentives (e.g. rules for participation and transaction within the ecosystem), our study points 
to the hub firm’s orchestration of OOI investments as a dynamic emerging process of alignment 
of ecosystem members’ incentives. By developing and externally exploiting technologies that 
also offer value-creating opportunities to other actors in the ecosystem, the hub firm can steer 
those actors’ complementary activities so as to benefit its core business. The investments in 
new technologies orchestrated by the hub firm become, then, a strategic mechanism for aligning 
the incentives and shaping the technology investments of other ecosystem actors.  
  The strategic use of OOI unearthed by our study contributes to enriching our understanding 
of the reasons that may drive firms operating in business ecosystems to externally exploit their 
knowledge and ideas. While prior work has highlighted various strategic objectives that may 
lead firms to practice outbound open innovation (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Lichtenthaler, 
2010; West, 2003), it provides limited insights into how those objectives may be shaped by 
firms’ interdependencies with the activity of other ecosystem actors. Our findings suggest that 
firms embedded in ecosystems of interdependent innovations may resort to OOI to address 
external innovation challenges, such as technological bottlenecks in their complementary 
activities, that hinder their value creation capacity in the core business. By shedding light on 
the mechanism underpinning this strategic use of OOI, which revolves around the investment 
in new technologies that may align the incentives of the ecosystem actors involved, our study 
informs the literature in several ways.  
 First, by suggesting that the success of the outbound open innovation process orchestrated 
by the hub firm depends on its ability to identify technologies able to incentivize adoption by 
external deployers, we add to the literature on desorptive capacity. While prior work has 
highlighted that a firm’s ability to identify valuable opportunities for external knowledge 
exploitation is key to the success of its OOI initiatives (Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2010; 
Ziegler et al., 2013), it provides limited insights into how the perspective of the potential 
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knowledge recipient is integrated into this identification process. Our findings suggest that, by 
considering the perspective of potential deployers, firms may be able to identify technologies 
offering them appropriate incentives for adoption, thus improving their desorptive capacity. 
 Second, by focusing on project-level dynamics, as solicited by recent OI studies that have 
highlighted the dearth of OI research at the project level (e.g. West et al., 2014), we uncovered 
that, by investing in technologies with a broadening potential for its deployers and for which a 
strong control over the relevant IP could be exerted, the hub firm could align their incentives 
and get the novel technologies deployed. The potential deployers evinced no interest in adopting 
technologies that merely offered efficiency gains within the same technological trajectory or 
for which there was insufficient control over IP. By suggesting that the successful orchestration 
of OOI projects revolves around the identification of technologies that can offer both value 
creation and value appropriation opportunities to the potential adopters, our findings underscore 
the importance of taking the business model of other firms in the ecosystem into account when 
pursuing OOI in ecosystem settings.  
 Third, by suggesting that a strong control over the technology IP is crucial to align the 
incentives of potential deployers and entice them to adopt the technologies developed by the 
hub firm, we contribute to the current debate on the role of appropriability in OOI activities. 
The practice of OOI has been traditionally associated with the presence of formal IP protection 
mechanisms, enabling firms to appropriate value from the external exploitation of their 
knowledge (Dahlander and Gann, 2010; West, 2006). However, recent studies on free revealing 
have highlighted that firms practicing OOI may decide to voluntarily waive some of their IPRs 
to achieve more strategic objectives, such as growing the market or attracting third-party 
contributions (Henkel et al., 2014; West, 2003). Our findings suggest that the possibility of 
exerting strong control over the IP of novel technologies expedites the hub firm’s pursuit of 
their external exploitation by enabling deployers to extract value from them. By pointing to 
control over IP as a mechanism to align the activities and incentives of different ecosystem 
actors, our study contributes to shed further light on the link between appropriability and OI in 
ecosystem settings, answering recent calls for more research in the area (Chesbrough and 
Bogers, 2014; West et al., 2014).  
 
5.2 Managerial implications  
 
Our study also yields important implications for practitioners. It suggests that firms may 
effectively use OOI as a strategy to remove bottlenecks in the business ecosystem and to 
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accelerate progress outside their boundaries. The effectiveness of this strategy, however, 
depends on firms’ ability to select technological projects able to incentivize adoption by 
external deployers. Therefore, when deciding about investments in technologies for which 
external deployment is sought, managers should weigh the potential impact on the product and 
service portfolios of the prospective adopting firms, which may affect their actual 
implementation. Another important implication concerns the allocation of resources for 
technology development. The assessment of the potential of different technologies to be 
deployed may inform related resource allocation decisions. Projects deemed unlikely to be 
adopted can be opportunely discontinued, avoiding escalation of commitment. Our findings 
also suggest that, by engaging key potential deployment partners early in the process, managers 
may increase the chances of finding a “home” for the novel technologies. 
 
5.3. Limitations and future research  
 
Like every study, ours has its limitations, which also represent promising avenues for future 
research. First, the study draws on a small sample of projects within a single company and 
industry setting. While this enhances comparability across cases and helps us identify the key 
discriminant factors, it raises concerns about generalizability. In particular, the industry in 
which our study is set – the upstream oil and gas industry – presents some idiosyncratic 
characteristics (e.g. oligopolistic industry, strongly integrated value chains) which may limit 
the generalizability of our findings. Nevertheless, we believe that the ecosystem dynamics and 
OI strategies we have explored characterize a growing number of industries and organizations. 
We also identified clear boundary conditions for the successful deployment of OOI projects 
that can help determine whether or not our insights apply to other contexts. However, their 
interplay could still be influenced by other factors specific to the alternative setting. Future 
research could investigate OOI dynamics in other contexts and enlarge upon our boundary 
conditions.  
 Second, at this stage, our study offers limited evidence of the diffusion at industry level of 
the new technologies examined. A longer time horizon would be required to actually observe 
their commercialization and adoption patterns across the industry.  
 Third, although we interviewed multiple actors, including service companies, to understand 
the different roles they played in the ecosystem’s innovation dynamics and their respective 
objectives, this paper provides no direct account of how service providers viewed the specific 
projects we investigated. We indirectly captured their perspectives and gained an understanding 
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of their incentives to deploy the focal technologies through the project files made available by 
the hub firm, which included minutes of the meetings held to discuss projects’ deployment 
prospects. However, this might have limited the set of elements we were able to identify that 
might have influenced service providers’ deployment decisions. Future research should delve 
deeper into the incentives of different ecosystem members in order to capture possible 
influences on the key actors and their relationships. 
 Fourth, our study is limited in prescriptions about the OOI projects that were not deployed. 
Although OOI seems not to work in the case of deepening technologies and insufficient control 
over IP, the hub firm could still be interested in seeing these technologies implemented. What 
should the hub firm do then if the alignment of incentives with service providers in the 
ecosystem cannot be established through OOI for such technologies? In the case of deepening 
technologies, irrespective of the control over IP, one option could be deploying the technology 
directly by investing in the complementary activities. In the case of broadening technologies 
but limited control over the related IP, one option for the hub firm could be to gain IP control 
by acquiring the specialized contractors owning the IP and then seek external deployment. 
Given that this would entail significant resources, it might be an attractive option inasmuch as 
it offers the hub firm the opportunity to acquire broader skills/technologies applicable to other 
areas. Future research should investigate deployment strategies in the cases outlined above. 
 Finally, our study focuses on the alignment of incentives for providers of complementary 
activities and services in the focal firm’s business ecosystem at the upstream level. While we 
believe that our framework can be applied also to complements produced downstream (i.e. 
services that complement and extend the value of the product system for the end customer), the 
mechanisms might be different and context specific. For instance, Adner and Kapoor’s (2010) 
study on the semiconductor lithography equipment industry suggests that when the 
technological bottlenecks are located downstream, the focal firm may invest directly in the 
production of those complements to remove the bottlenecks. Similarly, in looking at the console 
videogame industry, Cennamo (2016) finds that console platform owners invest more 
intensively in the direct production of complements (i.e. games) when transitioning to next-
generation platforms to overcome the initial shortage of supply of complements due to the 
limited incentives of complementors to commit to the novel technology at early stages. While 
in Adner and Kapoor (2010) the focal firm may invest to safeguard from potential value 
appropriation concerns, in Cennamo (2016) the platform owner invests mainly to create an 
initial market for the novel technology, thus generating some initial value for complementors 
in terms of addressable demand. Both studies are concerned with incentive alignment, a central 
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aspect in the ecosystem literature (Adner, 2017). In Adner and Kapoor (2010) the market 
already exists; the mechanism of incentives alignment is more about disciplining 
complementors’ cooperative behaviour. In Cennamo (2016) it is more about broadening 
complementors’ market opportunities. Future research should explore alternative mechanisms 
to align incentives among ecosystem actors and their effectiveness in different contexts. 
 Despite these limitations, we believe our exploratory study and its findings point to 
interesting directions for future research on OOI and shed light on critical and underexplored 
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• Develop technologies strategic 
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Technology out-licensing  • Access complementary assets  
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adoption of new technologies 







• Accelerate development and 
commercialization of 
complementary innovations  
• Engage with external actors 
(users and firms) to spur 
ecosystem-related innovation  












































outcomes Type of deployment 
ALPHA o Well completion: 
perforation technology  
o Typical area of expertise 
of service companies  
Wide set of possible applications, e.g.: 
o Tight gas reservoirs 
o Fractured reservoirs 
o Heavy oil reservoirs 
High-risk project: 
concept not yet 










$ 875,000 Cooperation with a 





available to the 
market and adopted 
by many service 
companies  
Joint venture 




BETA o Well logging technology 
o Typical area of expertise 
of service companies 
Wide set of possible applications, e.g.:  
o Multi-well developments 
o Poor hole conditions 
o Impossible-to-log wells 
o Exploration dipstick wells 
Technically simple 
project but highly 
complex and risky 












$ 400,000 Cooperation with 
manufacturers of bits 




available to the 
market and part of a 
major service 
provider’s portfolio 




GAMMA o Well completion: sand 
management technique 
o Typical area of expertise 
of service companies 
Narrow set of applications, e.g.: 
o Open-hole completion 
o Cased hole well designs 
o Wells using expandable tubular 
technologies  
Low technical risk 









Less than 2 
 
 
$ 470,000 No involvement of 
external partners given 
that no technology 




Novel solution not 





application of the 
novel solution  
DELTA o Well completion: 
downhole seal welding 
o Typical area of expertise 
of service companies 
Wide set of possible applications, e.g.: 
o Spider wells in HPHT fields 
o Long casing flows in HPHT fields 
o Retrofitting of smart well 
equipment 
o Well repairs 
 
High technical risk 








4–6 $ 565,000 Cooperation with 
manufacturers of 




Novel solution not 
available to the 
market  
 
Licensing of the novel 
solution to service 
companies  
OMEGA o Well completion: 
downhole fluid 
chemical analyser 
o Typical area of expertise 
of service companies 
 
Wide set of possible applications, e.g.: 
o Drilling fluids (ion content, shale 
inhibitors, biocides) 
o Completion fluids (compatibilities 
of acids and brines, pollutants) 
o Production fluids (scale prevention, 
geochemical analysis, incipient 
incompatibilities) 
o Enabler for deep-water drilling 
Low technical risk 







4–6 $ 675,000 Cooperation with an 
external contractor 




Novel solution not 
available to the 
market  
 
Licensing of the novel 




Table 3. Cross-case comparison  
Deployment 
status Project 
Technology attributes Deployment incentives  Enabling factors for deployment 




Potential impact on complementors’ portfolios Control over IP Engagement with deployment partners 






Highly innovative technology with 
a potential to open up a new 







The proposed technology outperforms those 
offered by oilfield service providers. Its adoption 
may broaden their portfolios but threatens to 
cannibalize some of their existing products. 
Full control 
 
IP rights owned by 
another company, but 
ELEKTRA has an 
exclusive licence to use 





partners approached in 










Highly innovative technology with 
a potential to completely change 
the way ELEKTRA and the whole 







Superior to conventional logging methods used by 
oilfield service providers, the proposed novel 
technology would enable them to broaden their 
service portfolios but would compete with some of 
their established solutions.  
Full control 
 
IP rights with ELEKTRA 




partners approached in 
early stages of the 
technology 










Novel completion technique based 
on the use of an already existing 
technology owned by one of the 







Based on an existing technology, the proposed 
completion technique threatens to cannibalize 
those used by oilfield service providers without 
enabling them to expand their portfolios, but just 
to deepen them. 
No control 
 
No possibility to enforce 
IP rights since the 
patent on the employed 















Novel completion technique based 
on the use of existing technologies 










The proposed welding solution outperforms those 
offered by oilfield service providers. Its adoption 
may help deepen their portfolios but threatens to 
cannibalize their alternative existing products. 
Full control 
 





partners approached in 









Highly innovative technology with 
a potential to completely change 
the way ELEKTRA and the whole 





Cost reduction  
Broadening effect 
 
Superior to existing solutions used by oilfield 
service providers, the proposed novel technology 
would enable them to broaden their service 
portfolios but threatens to cannibalize their 
existing chemical analysing solutions.  
Control by other 
company 
 
Patent on the 
microfluidic chips 
owned by a specialized 




partners approached in 

















Figure 2. The hub firm’s orchestration process 
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Appendix A. Sources of data 
 
Table A1. Sources of data 










Books published by Elektra between 1996 and 2010 
 
1. Emerging technological areas 
2. Energy scenarios to 2050 
3. BV activities and process written by BV managing director and lead 
scientists 
4. BV success stories written by BV managing director and scientists 
Books written by Elektra’s and BV’s executives and senior 
scientists providing information on: key trends in the energy 
industry and innovation trajectories followed by most 
players; innovative activities run by the BV team and their 
role within BV projects successfully deployed. 
 
 
Internal presentations  
 
1. BV review and funding process (3) 
2. BV project evaluation criteria (4) 
3. BV project domains and portfolio overview (2) 
4. Innovation in the energy sector and strategic projects (2) 
5. R&D portfolio reviews (3) 
Presentations given by Elektra’s and BV’s executives 
illustrating respectively the strategic areas of innovation for 
Elektra and the functioning of the project review and 
funding process implemented by the BV unit. This material 
enriched our understanding of the domains of interest to 
the company and of the evaluation criteria guiding the 
selection and development of BV projects. 
 Database containing semi-structured minutes related to the evaluation 
process of all 1,527 innovative ideas received and reviewed by the BV unit 
between 1996 and 2009. It includes presentations, project plans and 
budgets referred to each of the proposed ideas. 
These project-level data enriched our understanding of the 
factors influencing the development and deployment of the 
innovative ideas vetted by the BV team, enhancing the 














BV unit and 
projects 
Two rounds (2008; 2010), 12 interviews with 11 members: 
 
1. Elektra: VP for EP R&D, managing director of Internal Venture Capital 
Fund, BV managing director and senior scientist 
2. Other oil major: Head of Technology EP, VP for Breakthrough 
Innovation (2) Former VP for R&D and Technology Planning 
3. National oil company (NOC): Head of Technology Strategy 
4. Service company: Technical Director 
5. Industry experts: an academic professor and consultant that 
authored articles/books on oil majors and a senior industry lobbyist 
expert on technology development strategies in the industry 
 
Three rounds (2008; 2009; 2010), 38 interviews with 16 members 
 
1. BV managing director and members of the BV team 
2. Managing director of Elektra’s Internal Venture Capital Fund 
3. Proponents and sponsors of selected BV projects  
4. Participants in BV panel review meetings 
 
 
Broad questions on industry structure and competitive 
drivers; industry evolution since the first oil crisis; role of oil 
majors (including Elektra) and other industry players; 
innovative dynamics and oil majors’ technology 








The first round of interviews focused on the genesis, 
structure, goals and practices of the BV unit. It helped us 
gain a good understanding of the role of the BV unit within 
Elektra, of how innovative ideas are evaluated and selected, 
and of their main deployment routes. 
 
The second and third rounds of interviews focused on 
project-level dynamics. Informants were asked questions 
on: the genesis of selected BV projects and their main 
characteristics; key events in their development process; 
resources/capabilities required to move them forward; 
main hurdles that hindered their progress; their overall 
outcomes and deployment routes. 
Other archival 
sources 
1. 9 reports on the oil and gas industry and the EP business 
(Datamonitor; Accenture, BCG, KPMG, Roland Berger: Society of 
Petroleum Engineers) 
2. 14 academic and newspapers articles on the oil and gas industry  
3. 3 scholarly publications on the BV unit 
 
This material was used to gather information on the oil and 
gas industry, its main actors and dynamics, and evolution 
over time, and to triangulate related data gained from 
primary sources (interviews, workshop attendance). 
 
They enriched our understanding of the role of the BV unit 
within Elektra, of how they evaluate and select innovative 




1. 21-02-08 Enabling global innovation in E&P, Society of Petroleum 
Engineers 
2. 17-06-08 The future of oil and gas, Society of Petroleum Engineers 
(SPE) 
3. 26-03-09 Competitiveness: what future in the E&P industry? SPE 
4. 23-03-10 SPE Intelligent Energy Conference, Utrecht 
5. 20-09-10 SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, Florence 
6. 16-11-10 R&D investment trends and the rise of NOCs, SPE 
 
Workshop documentation (e.g. handouts) and personal research notes on 
presentations 
 
Attended workshops mainly focused on innovation and 
competitive challenges and dynamics in the oil and gas 
industry. Information on the industry architecture and R&D 
investment trends were gathered and used to triangulate 
interview data and documental facts. They also helped gain 
a good understanding of the industry from the different 
perspectives of the actors involved. 
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Appendix B. Data structure 
 
Table B1. Coding scheme 
First order concepts Second order themes Aggregate themes 
 
1. Radical innovation 
2. Incremental innovation 
 
 
3. Productivity improvement  






5. Exclusive license to use technology  
6. Proprietary technology 
7. IP owned by another company 
8. No IP protection enforceable 
 
 
9. Broadening effect on service portfolios  






11. Early engagement with potential 
deployers 




13. No first implementer available 
14. Operating Unit as first implementer 
15. Service company as first implementer 
 
 






























Availability of a first implementer 
 












































Table B2. Exemplifying evidence 
Exemplifying quotations Second order themes 
 
1. Radical innovation 
“The technology is totally new, based on completely different physics. It is totally new 
ground for the exploration and production industry” 
2. Incremental innovation 
“It is basically an alternative application of an existing technology” 
 
 
3. Productivity improvement 
“We invented something that service companies will sell us for big money through our 
operations, but what Elektra gets back is a well that produces more than before” 
4. Cost reduction 
“This new welding method will enable potential cost savings of about 15%” 
 
 
5.  Exclusive licence to use technology  
“All IP is with company X, however we now have an exclusive licence. We discussed the 
option to try and buy the IP, but it didn’t progress” 
6. Proprietary technology 
“We got 14 patents that covered a very wide range of applications” 
7. IP owned by another company 
“There was some discussion on the deployment. Since company X had the IP on the water-
jet technology it was not clear how it was going to be finally packed” 
8.  No IP protection enforceable 
“It is more like a technique. It is not something I could patent. It is very difficult to protect”  
 
 
9. Broadening effect on service portfolios 
“It is a new technology play. It is a big area with several potential applications. The project 
has the potential to open up a big market for ultra-deep perforators that hasn’t been 
occupied yet” 
10. Deepening effect on service portfolios 
“This problem of controlling sand is already addressed by service companies but with the 




11. Early engagement with potential deployers 
“All these people were kept updated constantly on how this project was moving on. So, 
when it was finally tested and proven, they were ready to take it” 
12. Late engagement with potential deployers 
“If you have the end-customers of the project involved at an early stage, they might want to 
change it completely, and we don’t like that. That’s why we decided to involve them at the 
end of the project” 
 
 
13. No first implementer available 
“What I didn’t have was a first implementer. Whenever you go for an invention, it is better 
to have a first implementer, somebody that as soon as it is ready is willing to run it” 
14. Operating Unit as first implementer 
“I got a feedback from the operating units that they had two wells available for us. But they 
were not driving the process, just sitting and waiting for us” 
15. Service company as first implementer 
“We explained the opportunity to potential partners, including company X, Y, Z. Company A 

















































Availability of a first 
implementer 
 
 
 
 
 
